In December 2006, Indonesian Health Minister, Siti Fadilah Supari, shocked the world when announcing her government would no longer be sharing samples of the H5N1 avian flu virus, collected from Indonesian patients, with the World Health Organization, at a time when global fears of a deadly influenza pandemic were running high. For observers of Southeast Asian politics, the decision reinforced the view of the region as made up of states determined to protect their national sovereignty, at almost all costs. This established view of the region, however, generally neglects the variable and selective manner in which sovereignty has been invoked by Southeast Asian governments, or parts thereof, and fails to identify the conditions shaping the deployment of sovereignty. In this article, it is argued that Siti's action was designed to harness claims of sovereignty to a domestic political struggle. It was a response to the growing fragmentation and, in some cases, denationalisation of the governance apparatus dealing with public health in Indonesia, along with the 'securitisation' of H5N1 internationally. The examination of the virus-sharing dispute demonstrates that in Southeast Asia sovereignty is not so much the ends of government action, but the means utilised by government actors for advancing particular political goals.
Introduction
In December 2006, then Indonesian Health Minister, Siti Fadilah Supari, shocked the world when announcing her government would no longer be sharing samples of the H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus, collected from Indonesian patients, with the World Health Organization (WHO). The decision disrupted the longstanding Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) -the WHO-coordinated international regime for managing seasonal and pandemic influenza -at a time when global fears of a deadly H5N1 pandemic in humans were running very high. GISN was premised on countries sharing virus specimens freely with the WHO, which then sent them to reference laboratories for assessment. The specimens ultimately ended up in the hands of pharmaceutical companies, which produced vaccines and sold these back to governments at a profit. Controversially, Siti claimed Indonesian sovereignty over viruses collected within Indonesia. She further justified her action by arguing that GISN was deeply unfair towards developing countries and that the governments and populations of these countries, because of their sovereign right over 'their' viruses, were entitled to a greater share of the benefits from the production of vaccines made with these viruses. Horrified international observers accused Siti of undermining global health security for narrow national interests (e.g. Holbrooke and Garrett 2008; Fidler 2007a) .
The virus-sharing dispute led to an intense period of international negotiations, concluding in May 2011 with the ratification of a new agreement by the World Health Assembly (WHA).
For many seasoned observers of Southeast Asian politics, Siti's decision was no shock at all, as it seemed to fit the broader picture of a region dedicated to the preservation of national sovereignty, at almost all costs. A near-consensus exists in the literature that the region's states are highly resistant to encroachments on their national sovereignty. The norm of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, also known as the 'ASEAN Way', is seen by many to be an almost sacred principle in the region (Acharya 2009; Haacke 2003; Leifer 1989; Narine 2006) . Growing economic interdependence, along with the emergence or worsening of a range of trans-boundary, 'non-traditional' security (NTS) issues in recent decades -infectious disease, environmental degradation, climate change, transnational crime, and Islamist terrorism -are seen to have tested this commitment. But most observers nevertheless concur that the region's preference for harder, 'Westphalian', forms of national sovereignty has been maintained, even in the face of serious transnational threats, whose amelioration necessitates coordinated international action (Caballero-Anthony 2005 Acharya 2009; Maier-Knapp 2011; Stevenson and Cooper 2009; Kamradt-Scott and Lee 2011 ).
Yet, a closer inspection of the response to H5N1 in Indonesia suggests that this established view of the region cannot fully explain Siti's actions. In fact, Indonesian 'sovereignty' in health governance had already been considerably undermined beforehand, and significant interventions persisted even after the virus-sharing dispute. While Siti's refusal to share human viruses received much attention, it is striking that the sharing of H5N1 viruses from poultry with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) had never ceased, while the cooperation between WHO and Indonesian health officials within Indonesia was generally also unaffected. Furthermore, massive internationally funded interventions, to facilitate better local capacity for surveillance of and response to outbreaks, have been implemented in subnational animal and human health services.
What this mixed picture, in which intervention and non-intervention are both present, demonstrates is that rather than the Indonesian government's dedication to protecting national sovereignty explaining the virus-sharing dispute, it is Siti's invocation of sovereignty that actually needs to be explained. Scholars' insistence on characterising the Southeast Asian region in terms of states' dedication to Westphalian sovereignty risks neglecting important developments occurring underneath the surface of inter-state relations that could explain the usage of sovereignty by governments. So rather than being assumed away, Siti's move needs to be situated within the broader contemporary contestation over power and resources shaping state-society relations, as well as the very nature of statehood, in Indonesia.
The starting point for this analysis is to recognise the political, contested and potentially shifting nature of sovereignty 'regimes' -the historically specific arrangements regularising patterns of intervention and non-intervention in a region, or worldwide (see Agnew 2009 ). Rather than an end in itself, sovereignty is better understood as 'a strategic tool to define the scope of political conflict, to determine which forces are included within a particular struggle for power' (Jones 2012: 16) . As in many initially unstable postcolonial states, Southeast Asian governments have for decades used sovereignty and 'national security' selectively as a means of protecting their preferred domestic social and political orders. In ASEAN, this was mainly directed during the Cold War at shoring up fledgling capitalist regimes, by preventing communist challengers within from joining forces with counterparts across borders. In the post-Cold War era, and especially since the Asian crisis, however, the region's sovereignty regime has been far less coherent, reflecting rising intraelite divisions and the effects of globalisation (Jones 2012) . Assertions of national sovereignty are now made by different parts of the state, at different times, in different contexts, for different purposes, and at times at cross-purposes. Indeed, the social and political orders that sovereignty assertions are meant to support have not remained static in Southeast Asia, and neither has the region's sovereignty regime. Therefore, the ends served by the use of sovereignty in the region should not be presupposed, but rather its mobilisation in particular contexts deserves explanation.
Specifically, I argue that Siti's action was designed to harness claims of sovereignty to a domestic political struggle, but the scope of 'domestic' politics, in relation to public health issues, has significantly changed over the past decade. The virus-sharing ban was a response to the growing fragmentation and, in some cases, denationalisation of the governance apparatus dealing with public health in Indonesia, along with the 'securitisation' of H5N1 internationally. The fragmentation of Indonesia's health governance has sucked authority and funding out of the Ministry of Health (MoH) in Jakarta, already relatively weak vis-à-vis other government departments, rendering it one of many organisations vying for influence and funding in the management of infectious disease. The securitisation of H5N1 internationally provided the opportunity for this power grab, by raising the perceived stakes associated with mismanaging the disease and making considerable amounts of international funding available (Elbe 2010) .
Viewed in this way, Siti's decision to withhold viruses, citing national sovereignty, represents one of many positions in a complex struggle over power and resources, played out through contestation over the appropriate governance arrangements through which transnational problems, like H5N1, should be dealt with. It was essentially an attempt to reassert control over public health agendas and funding, not by tackling domestic opponents head-on -too difficult an undertaking for the MoH, particularly when powerful interests relating to agribusiness and livestock industries were involved -but by shifting the conflict to an intergovernmental arena. At the WHO, the MoH was the sole Indonesian representative, and the adjustments it sought in GISN would have made it a key player in the management of future international funds relating to vaccine production and attendant benefits. Siti's sovereignty assertion also had the effect of muscling out the MoH's main rival for supremacy within Indonesian infectious disease surveillance and research networks -the United States Naval Area Medical Research Unit No. 2 (NAMRU-2). This recentralisation attempt had a particular ideological appeal to Siti -an ardent supporter of Sukarno-style anti-imperialism and Pancasila.
I follow by looking at the broader context of health governance in Indonesia today, to identify the factors that promoted and constrained Siti's power-grab. I then demonstrate that Siti's invocation of sovereignty was not simply a reaction to international intervention in Indonesia's domestic affairs, by showing the extent to which encroachments on Indonesian sovereignty had already occurred prior to the virus-sharing dispute, including with MoH complicity. Finally, I will analyse of the politics of 'viral sovereignty'.
The notable example of the virus-sharing dispute shows that sovereignty is a means used by governmental actors to advance particular political goals. It also highlights the need to pay greater attention than the literature currently affords to the changing domestic context shaping the conditions in which sovereignty is mobilised by Southeast Asian governments, particularly the implications of the emergence of increasingly fragmented and transnationally penetrated states.
The fragmentation of health governance in Indonesia
The governance arrangements associated with the management of public health in Indonesia have fragmented considerably over the preceding decade or so. Particularly in the area of infectious disease surveillance and response, we now see a wide range of state and non-state agencies jostling for turf and funding from domestic and international sources. In this context, as the virus-sharing case demonstrates, sovereignty claims are becoming less coherent too -not so much attached to an overarching national agenda but reflecting specific contestations over authority and control of resources, involving government ministries or sections thereof and associated societal interests.
The fragmentation of Indonesia's health governance apparatus is a result of two interrelated processes. The first is the emergence of more regulatory global health governance. This process is primarily reflected in, but in fact precedes, the arrival of the 
Regulatory global health governance
According to Fidler (2007b) , we are witnessing a tentative shift from what he calls 'Westphalian' international health governance to 'post-Westphalian' global health governance. This is particularly reflected in the changing nature of the IHRs. The nowdefunct 1969 IHRs focused on the management of international contact-points -airports, border-crossings and ports -and only required governments to notify the WHO of outbreaks of six infectious diseases -cholera, the plague, relapsing fever, smallpox, typhus and yellow fever -while the WHO was obliged to rely only on information provided by governments.
The 2003 SARS outbreak proved a watershed moment in the transformation of international health governance. In particular, the Chinese government's initial cover-up of the outbreaks and subsequent refusal to cooperate with the WHO was seen to have allowed the pathogen to spread, reaching as far as Toronto within days (Fidler 2003 (Davies 2012: 593) .
The revised IHRs place a greater focus on the quality and capacities of domestic health systems in the management of infectious disease for the broader benefit of global health security, specifying the competences states need to have to be prepared for epidemics.
They also provide the WHO with the authority to obtain information from nongovernmental sources and declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) (KamradtScott 2011). Unlike their predecessors, the revised IHRs do not attempt to specify which infectious diseases could be designated as PHEIC, giving the WHO discretionary powers on the basis of information from the field.
The emergence of regulatory global health governance has coincided with the trend for the 'securitisation' of infectious disease (Davies 2008; Elbe 2009; McInnes and Lee 2006) . Many now note that some public health issues, mainly rapidly spreading infectious diseases, have come to be seen as 'pressing existential threats that require urgent and extraordinary international policy responses', thus 'abandoning the decades-old convention of equating security with the absence of armed conflict between states' (Elbe 2009: 2) . The securitisation of infectious disease has undoubtedly led to an increasing emphasis upon, and rising funding allocated by the governments of richer countries towards, programs aimed at improving the capacities of developing countries for surveillance of and response to emerging infectious diseases (Calain 2007; Smith 2012; Lakoff 2008 ).
For example, in the international effort to combat H5N1 more than $2 billion were in 2006 pledged by donors, such as the US, European Union, Japan and Australia (Scoones 2010) . As a result, substantial funds were spent in countries where outbreaks had occurred, approximately $130 million of which in Indonesia -the hardest-hit country (Forster 2010: 131) . That such significant amounts were allocated to combat a disease that at that point had only killed a relatively small number of humans was a direct result of the tendency to treat H5N1 as a pressing security problem with a particularly devastating potential (Elbe 2010; see Davis 2005) .
The fragmentation of Indonesian health governance promoted by these trends was further exacerbated by the growing concern among public health experts and epidemiologists with the risk of zoonoses -pathogens crossing the species boundary from animals to humans. Indonesia into the effort to combat infectious diseases. Since preventing pandemics is seen to require capacity for surveillance and response in wild, domestic and livestock animals, and as the incidence of zoonoses is arguably affected by issues like climate change and deforestation, the scope of what constitutes 'domestic health governance' in relation to infectious disease management has expanded dramatically in recent years (see Coker et al. 2011 ). This expansion has also had the effect of giving powerful interests associated with livestock and other agribusiness industries a strong stake in the way that some infectious diseases are managed (Vu 2011) .
Within Indonesia, therefore, managing infectious diseases is no longer the sole purview of the Directorate-General of Disease Control within the MoH -the lead agency under the old IHRs. Tellingly, the scope of that office has expanded to include 'environmental health' and a new sub-departmental unit specialising in zoonoses was Minister for Economics, the commander of the armed forces, the police chief, and the chair of the Indonesian Red Cross. It had a secretariat led by the Vice-Minister of Agriculture and six task-forces, involving scientists and other experts, meant to provide direction on research and development, animal health, human health, vaccine and anti-viral medicines, and mass communications and public information (Forster 2010: 145) . Individual ministries retained their control of operating budgets, however, and also in most cases maintained independent relationships with international funding bodies.
On top of this, many nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) have also been funded to participate, mainly in surveillance and communication activities. For example, NGO the Center for Indonesian Veterinary Analytical Studies (CIVAS) was donor-funded to conduct research into the incidence of H5N1 along the poultry production and marketing chain.
Decentralisation and health governance in Indonesia
Further driving the fragmentation of health governance in Indonesia has been the process of government decentralisation. In Indonesia, decentralisation was adopted under international pressure in the early post-Suharto era by the weak Habibie government and implemented from 2001 (Hadiz 2010: 23) . It represented a radical break from the pre-existing highly centralised authoritarian order. Indonesia's decentralisation laws devolve many previously centrally located responsibilities and resources to the district (kabupaten) or more rarely to provincial levels of government. In particular, a substantial proportion of tax revenue now flows to, and is managed at, the district level. In most cases, however, rather than promote neoliberal 'good governance' -government accountability, transparency and efficient use of public monies -as it was purported to do, decentralisation has empowered local predatory politico-business interests now posing as democratic leaders or defenders of particular ethnic groups and traditions (Hadiz 2010) . Many of these local elites were ironically nurtured earlier by the highly centralised New Order regime. These well-placed elites were able to capture the benefits of decentralisation for themselves and their supporters, marginalising opponents through various means, including 'money politics' and the use of violence and intimidation.
Instead of reducing corruption by making governance participatory, decentralisation has markedly increased corruption at the local level and made it very unpredictable compared with the Suharto era. Corrupt practices have in many cases become a crucial component of contests over control of local state apparatuses and associated resources, as well as for maintaining localised predatory patronage networks, upon which political power often depends (Hadiz 2010: 36-38) .
The decentralisation of government has had two major implications in the context of infectious disease management. First, international donors have had to develop multilevel governance approaches to counter the fragmenting tendencies of Indonesia's decentralisation.
Indeed, as one FAO official in Jakarta recounts, 'The central government has little or no outreach. We therefore work though Dinas [local government department] locally' (Interview 2011a). This has led to the emergence of new governance networks, connecting particular units within government departments across various levels in the service of managing specific public health concerns, with donors acting as coordinators. Second, those seeking to deflect the scrutiny associated with the international response to infectious diseases have often done so by keeping governance at the district or province levels and in the hands of local officials (Charnoz and Forster 2011) . On the other hand, key Jakarta ministries, which now often find themselves powerless vis-à-vis lower levels of government, have selectively attempted to harness activities related to the management of H5N1 and other infectious diseases in order to bolster the territorial and functional reach of their authority. They have also sought to blame decentralisation for their failures in managing H5N1. Siti, for example, argued:
Vietnam, as a centralised socialist country, can get high compliance on national policies and so has succeeded, for example, in implementing rapid culling of birds… In contrast, Indonesia is in transition towards a decentralized democracy after three decades of authoritarian national rule. We are still on a learning curve, and compliance of the relatively independent regional authorities with national policies is often poor (Butler 2007).
The fragmentation of Indonesia's health governance I describe is essential to understand to make sense of Siti's power-grab in the virus-sharing dispute and her use of national sovereignty. This is in terms of the motivation for this action, its objectives and the constraints on its achievements. In the next section, I develop my argument by demonstrating that Siti's actions cannot be explained simply as part of an overarching preference in Indonesian government for protecting national sovereignty. This is because considerable interventions associated with the management of H5N1 had existed before and during the virus-sharing dispute, including with MoH complicity.
International intervention in the governance of H5N1 in Indonesia
Siti Fadilah Supari's decision to discontinue the sharing of H5N1 specimens with the WHO is typically viewed as a reassertion of Indonesian sovereignty over the WHO's supranational authority. It is often argued that following a brief 'post-Westphalian' moment, resulting from the SARS shock, states have reasserted their national sovereignty over the WHO's supranational authority, with detrimental consequences to global efforts to deal with the threat of infectious disease (Calain 2007; Stevenson and Cooper 2009; Kamradt-Scott 2011; Smith 2012 ). Siti's virus-sharing dispute is viewed as the most significant manifestation of this nationalist backlash, as she was seen to challenge even her country's basic responsibility to cooperate with the WHO (Fidler 2010) . PDSR was reportedly foisted upon the FAO, mainly by the American government (see Charnoz and Forster 2011: 81) . Its objectives, however, were also premised on the central government's National Strategic Work Plan (NSWP), in which 'backyard' poultry was identified as a key priority. Donors essentially accepted the emphasis on backyard poultry, although supporting evidence was absent. As a result, PDSR was entirely focused on backyard poultry until late 2008 (Perry et al. 2009: 29) . Furthermore, the program was explicitly developed as a means of building the capacity of district animal health services at a time of perceived emergency -a service which was usually under-funded and often nonexistent. Because of decentralisation, PDSR's planners viewed direct engagement at the local level as essential. Indeed, in reflection of the tenacious struggles between local and national elites over control of rents from agricultural and livestock industries, the line of authority from the central MoA to local agricultural Dinas has in most cases broken down completely.
The implementation of PDSR created new functional networks connecting the national CMU and local offices, with a specific focus on managing H5N1.
As long as PDSR remained focused on the backyard sector it was described as an 'iconic success' (Perry et al. 2009: 26) , and cooperation with governments at all levels was 
The politics of 'viral sovereignty'
That such large-scale and intrusive interventions in the governance of H5N1 in Indonesia coincided with Siti's decision to withhold virus samples does not support the claim that the virus-sharing dispute was about the protection of Indonesian national sovereignty. It is rather my argument that the invocation of sovereignty by the MoH in this case was a strategic move to recentralise authority and funding, in a context of highly fragmented health governance in Indonesia, within which the MoH was increasingly marginalised.
But before we examine the MoH's deployment of sovereignty, it is essential first to evaluate two other potential explanations for Siti's actions, which go beyond the simplistic notion that it was a typical Indonesian assertion of national sovereignty: (a) that Siti's decision reflected her personal beliefs and somewhat erratic personality; and (b) that it was a reaction to the international securitisation of H5N1. Both offer useful, but partial, insights into the virus-sharing dispute and Siti's claims of 'viral sovereignty'.
To be sure, the virus-sharing dispute sat well with Siti's unquestionable personal preference for the ideology of anti-imperialism and self-reliance espoused by Indonesia's first President, Sukarno -an ideology instrumental in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement at the 1955 Bandung Asia-Africa Conference and the subsequent emergence of the 'ASEAN Way' (Acharya 2009: 54-55) . It also sat well with Siti's proclivity for conspiracy theories, involving the US government in particular (Lowe 2010: 161) . For example, in a book written at the height of the virus-sharing dispute, Siti (2008: 34) proclaimed:
Was this the neo-colonialism predicted by Soekarno, the first President of Indonesia, 50 years ago, when the incapability or the powerlessness of a nation can be the source of prosperity for other nation? Was the sharing of influenza viruses with the WHO, which had been implemented since 1952 under the control of the Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) also implied the same scheme?
This rhetoric also found many supporters in Indonesia and other developing countries, making Siti a popular public figure -unusual for an Indonesian Health Minister. Nonetheless, Siti's nationalism is not enough in itself to explain her actions, as it would then be difficult to account for the MoH's promotion of the DSO program at the same time. Clearly, the MoH, under Siti's leadership, was not entirely averse to international intervention to manage H5N1, and to WHO involvement specifically.
Another explanation, provided most explicitly by Stefan Elbe (2010; also Forster 2010; Calain 2007) , is that Siti was reacting to the 'securitisation' of H5N1 by the WHO and Western governments:
As fear about the threat of a possible human H5N1 pandemic spread across the world, many governments scrambled to stockpile anti-viral medications and vaccines, albeit in a context where there was insufficient global supply to meet such a rapid surge in demand. Realizing that they were the likely 'losers' in this international race, some developing countries began to openly question the benefits of maintaining existing forms of international health cooperation (Elbe 2010: 476) .
In other words, Siti is seen to have acted unilaterally because the securitisation of H5N1 made the disease a matter of national security for the governments of other states, which also acted unilaterally to protect their own citizens. Securitisation is therefore seen to have simultaneously brought the inequality inherent in GISN into sharp relief and provided opportunities for the Indonesian government to exploit the world's fear of a H5N1 pandemic.
There is considerable merit in this argument. Note, for example, Siti's (2008: 55) Yet, while observers like Elbe have tended to focus on the international bargaining power provided by the securitisation of H5N1 to Indonesia, they have neglected for the most part to investigate its domestic significance (Curley and Herington 2011) , and perhaps more importantly, the domestic context in which Siti's decision was made. It is the interaction between the securitisation of H5N1, which led to substantial funds being made available to combat the disease internationally, with the fragmented and partly transnationalised Indonesian health governance system that has shaped Siti's resort to 'viral sovereignty'.
The crucial factor shaping the MoH's behaviour in the response to the H5N1 crisis, and its usage of sovereignty specifically, has been the ministry's weakness vis-à-vis the MoA and local governments, resulting from its lack of powerful societal support-bases. In Indonesia, political power tends to be in the hands of predatory politico-business elites that rely on 'money politics' to fund systems of patronage that support their authority (Robison and Hadiz 2004) . Thus, the MoA became a particularly important ministry in the predecentralisation era, because it was responsible for regulating the lucrative agribusiness and livestock sectors. The formal and informal rents generated from these sectors, and the associated dispensation of licences to Suharto cronies, played an important part in the maintenance of the authoritarian New Order regime (see Robison 1986 ). After decentralisation, much of this authority was devolved to the districts and therefore conflicts between local and national authorities over control of benefits from these industries have become common and quite intense at times (Hadiz 2010) . Poultry industry conglomerates have been able to exploit this competition by encouraging local officials to resist national directives when these were detrimental to their commercial interests (Curley and Herington 2011: 157; Charnoz and Forster 2011) . At the same time, maintaining good relations with the MoA has remained important to big poultry producers operating in Indonesia and the large operators in the sector reportedly enjoy a close relationship with the ministry (Charnoz and Forster 2011: 90) .
In contrast, the MoH generally lacks links to powerful societal groups, as the activities it regulates and funds do not generate significant rent-seeking opportunities. While this has meant that the line of authority connecting the national MoH and local health Dinas, despite the devolution of approximately 80 per cent of the health budget, has not broken down in the same way as in agriculture, the MoH's leverage within government and vis-à-vis powerful interests in society is typically quite weak. The MoH's lack of powerful societal support-bases has made it particularly reliant on international funding for strengthening its relative position within Indonesian health governance, meaning it was particularly vulnerable to the effects of international funding leaking away to other parts of the state or to non-state actors.
The international effort to combat H5N1 has comprised two primary governance agendas, with different implications for the response within Indonesia, and for the MoH's use of sovereignty specifically. First, because H5N1 is a zoonosis that initially develops in poultry, programs, like PDSR and DSO, have been developed to provide surveillance of outbreaks in poultry, and response where possible, as well as identify its mechanisms of zoonotic transmission through surveillance of human cases at the source. Second, efforts have been made to study the avian flu virus and develop a vaccine (see Scoones and Forster 2010) .
In Indonesia, international funding was mainly funnelled into activities relating to the first agenda (see Lowe 2010) , with the MoH finding itself marginalised for two main reasons.
First, because H5N1 has not become easily transmissible between humans to-date, most international funding was directed into surveillance of and response to outbreaks in poultry. I already mentioned in this respect that while the PDSR program was rolled out in 29 provinces, its human health equivalent, the DSO program, was only implemented in eight.
Second, the international emphasis on managing infections in poultry saw tensions rise between the MoH and MoA, leading to struggles over which would be the lead agency in managing the Indonesian response to H5N1. Due to its lack of powerful societal supportbases, the MoH was in most cases the loser in these struggles, although most policymakers and practitioners viewed it as the more competent of the two ministries (Ear 2012: 181) . In one prominent example, the Agriculture bureaucracy managed to assume the lead role, despite MoH resistance, in the administration of poultry culling, a practice to which the MoA was antagonistic (Curley and Herington 2011: 159) . As a result, culling was only seldom deployed in Indonesia to manage H5N1, even though it was the preferred policy response of the OIE, FAO and WHO (see Scoones and Forster 2010) . By most accounts, the MoA assumed this stance because of strong resistance from the Indonesian poultry industry, which exerted considerable influence on decision-making in the ministry (Charnoz and Forster 2011: 91) . In fact, the poultry industry was so influential within the MoA that when Indonesia's Director of Animal Health, Dr Tri Satya Putri Naipospos, told the media of the existence of H5N1 in Indonesian poultry she immediately lost her job (Lowe 2010: 169 
The virus-sharing dispute and the expulsion of NAMRU-2 from Indonesia
Before the virus-sharing dispute, the MoH benefited relatively little from the considerable sums spent internationally on studying the H5N1 virus and developing a vaccine. Lowe By contrast, the US Navy's NAMRU-2 enjoyed far better funding, mainly from various US government sources, and at the time of the outbreaks operated 'a regional "reference lab" for influenza virus testing' (Lowe 2010: 154) . Based in Jakarta since 1991, in 2006 NAMRU-2 staff numbered 175, of which only 19 were American. There were 44
Indonesian scientists employed in NAMRU-2, many of whom among the country's bestqualified (Ear 2012: 167) . In the fiscal year 2006, at the height of the avian flu scare, NAMRU-2 received a total of $11 million, $2.6 million of which was special funding dedicated to avian and pandemic influenza surveillance (NAS 2007: 208) . Operating the expensive device used to run simultaneous testing of human respiratory pathogens alone cost NAMRU-2 more than $1 million annually (NAS 2007: 64) .
In 2006, as a prelude to the virus-sharing ban, Siti accused NAMRU-2 of espionage and violation of Indonesian sovereignty, saying it sent H5N1 specimens out of Indonesia without notifying or seeking permission from the MoH. She also publicly speculated that the samples were being turned into biological weapons in a secret US government facility in Los Alamos (Siti 2008 ). Siti ordered NAMRU-2's closure in 2008 and it was finally shut down in April 2010.
To understand why NAMRU-2 became a target for Siti, it is essential to understand the extent to which it was embedded within Indonesia's health governance system, and central to alternative surveillance networks that operated beyond the MoH's control. NAMRU-2's significance and authority, relative to the MoH, only increased as a result of the urgency attached to the response to H5N1.
While there is no evidence to support Siti's biological weapons allegation, NAMRU-2 was undoubtedly a prominent node in a health governance network operating within Indonesia that was not answerable to the Health Minister (NAS 2007: 69) . In the course of the decade prior to its closure, the unit's main purpose had shifted, not without internal resistance, from conducting research on tropical illnesses to disease surveillance, reflecting the growing concern worldwide with emerging infectious diseases (Lowe 2010: 157) . In effect, funding for NAMRU-2 supported 'a parallel ILI [influenza-like illness] surveillance system' (USAID 2008: 10) . Because of its superior funding, NAMRU-2 had a deep reach into Indonesia's provinces, often better than the MoH's, and conducted considerable independent research on infectious diseases, including H5N1. A USAID (2008: 11) report thus notes: 'Through these ILI surveillance systems NAMRU has managed to establish very productive relationships with key hospitals throughout Indonesia.' For example, before the virus-sharing ban in 2006 NAMRU-2 was receiving information regarding H5N1 outbreaks ahead of the MoH, which it then forwarded to the CDC, bypassing the MoH. This, according to a review of NAMRU-2's operations, 'created a delicate situation' (NAS 2007: 72) . Furthermore, the expensive equipment NAMRU-2 operated was not available to the Indonesian government. It remained Navy-owned and was not to be 'left behind should the influenza surveillance budget be severely curtailed' (NAS 2007: 71) .
Crucially, NAMRU-2 was not a foreign organ within Indonesia. As mentioned, most of the scientists employed in NAMRU-2 were Indonesian and it was deeply embedded within Indonesian medical research networks (NAS 2007: 74) In line with the broader argument of this article, the expulsion of NAMRU-2 must be looked at in relation to the particular context of Indonesian health governance, against the backdrop of the global H5N1 crisis. In essence, NAMRU-2 competed directly with the MoH for authority, and ultimately funding from international sources, but was vulnerable to the MoH's assertions of sovereignty in a way that the MoA was not. Dennis Normile (quoted in Ear 2012), writing in Science magazine, was thus correct to predict that NAMRU-2 would 'fall victim to Indonesia's determination to develop its own research capabilities and take control of its H5N1 viral samples.' But 'Indonesia', as we have seen, is not a monolith. The strategy emanated from the MoH for specific reasons, associated with its relative weakness.
There is evidence to suggest that even before the virus-sharing dispute Siti was keen for Indonesian government labs to move up the 'food chain', because she was angry at a WHO statement in May 2006 that the first human-to-human transmission might have occurred in Indonesia and was hoping genetic testing would prove her right (Smith 2012: 74) .
And, indeed, the assertion of 'viral sovereignty' has paid handsome dividends to MoHaffiliated research labs in Indonesia, at the expense of alternative centres of medical research. and Eijkman Institute in Jakarta as main referral labs (Setiawaty 2012: 210) . For this the NIHRD received substantial funding from several donors to purchase expensive diagnosis and detection equipment. It also received lab resources and ongoing capacity building support from the WHO (Setiawaty 2012: 210) . Importantly, these labs are nationally controlled, not an insignificant outcome in the decentralisation era.
The virus-sharing dispute was also used to attract funding from both international sources and other parts of the Indonesian government for vaccine production in Indonesia.
The government-owned pharmaceutical company PT Bio Farma, which produces routine immunisations, has recently expanded its operations to produce both seasonal and avian flu vaccines (Lowe 2010: 158) . Prior to the H5N1 outbreaks, Indonesians were small consumers of seasonal flu vaccine and vaccine production capacity was very low in the country as a result. In the new international framework for managing influenza that replaced GISN expanding developing countries' seasonal flu vaccine production is seen as essential for increasing world production capacity in preparedness for the surge in output required to meet In summary, the MoH was too weak to claim a greater share of the international funding for H5N1 mitigation programs in Indonesia from domestic rivals. As a result, MoH officials, including health ministers Siti and Endang, sought to deploy national sovereignty as a way of securing funding to research and surveillance activities that the MoH could dominate.
Conclusion
When Siti Fadilah Supari claimed 'viral sovereignty' over specimens of the deadly H5N1 avian influenza virus collected in Indonesia, this was seen by many observers to confirm the widely accepted view of Southeast Asia as a region of states dedicated to the preservation of hard forms of 'Westphalian' sovereignty, even in the face of serious transnational threats. I have argued that sovereignty should be seen not as the ends of state action, but as a means available to government actors in the pursuit of particular political goals. In this case, the deployment of 'viral sovereignty' was a generally successful attempt at recentralising authority and funding within the central MoH. Prior to Siti's launching of the virus-sharing dispute, the MoH, an already relatively weak ministry, was further weakened by the leakage of funding to other state and non-state agencies as a result of the emergence of a more diffuse and regulatory global health governance terrain and the advance of government decentralisation within Indonesia.
Echoing likeminded work (Jones 2012) , this article has endeavoured to show that the task for future research is identifying the precise circumstances in which claims for national sovereignty are made in Southeast Asia, as well as the circumstances in which interventions are allowed, or even encouraged, by governments. The insistence on characterising the region's states in terms of their dedication to Westphalian sovereignty risks ignoring or downplaying the significance of very important developments occurring just underneath that surface and which offer a more accurate reading of the region's political dynamics.
